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Abstract:  
It was more than four decades ago when James Tobin stressed the fallacy 
underlying the Latin motto "Post Hoc ergo Propter Hoc". His point was that a causal 
relation, back then between money and income, must rely on something more than 
time precedence. However, this fact has not received proper attention, contemporary 
literature explains the current depression from the financial crisis which preceded it 
and its' resolution depends on proper rules of financial regulation. This paper argues 
different, the current depression resulted from weak growth reflecting weak 
profitability. We show that under this reasoning financial crisis episodes are highly 
probable, serving as the trigger of depressions. The latter implies that financial assets 
valuation depends on a highly variable required rate of return, contrary to the 
postulations of modern investment theory. Highly volatile asset returns places 
financial markets in a world of true uncertainty as opposed to calculable risk. This 
shred of realism gives different meaning and limitations to financial regulation. Any 
regulatory policy monitoring liquidity or solvency ratios can prove insufficient as 
zero or weak growth turns unstable, an event usually preceded by increased amounts 
of speculative investments. Therefore, financial regulation should focus on what kind 
of assets financial intermediaries can sell and what kind of assets banks, pension 
funds, corporations and the broad public can hold to protect taxpayers from future 
bailout costs at least in part.  
Keywords: Crisis, Financial Crisis, Asset Valuation, Rate of Profit, Rate of Profit of 
Enterprise, Financialization.  
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Introduction:  
Following the dramatic times of subprime market failure in the U.S. extensive 
debates are taking place on how we can avoid similar events in the future. The 
postulation underlying these discussions is that financial crisis emerged from the 
structure of the post Bretton-Woods financial system and the depression which 
followed was actually caused by financial crisis itself. This type of reasoning 
appeared both in mainstream and heterodox economics. Mainstream economists are 
elaborating on the idea of "moral hazard" (Farhi & Tirole 2009) and heterodox 
economists on the "lethal mix of consumer credit with investment banking" 
(Lapavitsas 2009).  
Reasonably the discussion turned to financial system regulation policies. 
Suggestions on: separation of credit from investment banking, implementation of a 
new Bretton Woods treaty ensuring and regulating capital flows from surplus to 
deficit countries and regulation on bank executive bonuses are some of the ideas 
appearing in literature. Following the academic research legislators and policy makers 
are undertaking financial regulatory measures aiming to remove the causes of the 
crisis, thereby establishing the prerequisites for sustainable growth. 
In the meantime, however, the crisis is taking its' own course. Despite trillions 
spent to avoid meltdown in global financial markets, stagnation prevails in major 
economies, whereas sovereign debt crisis haunts peripheral countries in the EU south 
and Latin America, recently threatening also BRIC countries like India and Brazil. 
The duration and severity of the crisis has led economists like Paul Krugman 
(Krugman 2012), Bradford de Long and Lawrence Summers (De Long & Summers 
2012) to acknowledge that we are facing a depression.  
Contrary to the majority opinion in the profession, this paper argues that major 
financial crisis episodes are manifestations of deteriorating conditions in production 
and growth, and not the opposite. This causal link can explain the subprime market 
failure and asses the likelihood of major financial crisis episodes in the current phase.  
Following the subprime market collapse banks were given vast state funds 
through capital injection and asset purchases, while enjoying unlimited central bank 
accommodation usually against low-grade collateral. The greatest part of these funds, 
however, were either held as "safety cushion" against further deterioration of bank 
asset side and depository base, or to finance corporate and sovereign bond issues 
(because it is acceptable collateral for central banks), or otherwise to support short-
term investments in equities and derivatives. Only a small part extended corporate and 
consumer lending. This is not surprising, since in a depression corporations are 
looking for means of payment to stay in business so they lack proper collateral, 
whereas households also lack creditworthiness at low levels of wages and 
employment. In light of the above, we analytically investigate major financial crisis 
episodes in the mix of fragile, zero or weak, growth trends with bank exposure to 
loans, bonds, equities and derivatives. In this context the ongoing gradual 
relinquishment of central bank accommodation policies may play an important part.  
Generalizing, this paper analytically explores financial crisis as reflection of 
weak growth which in turn implies weak profitability. In short financial panics are the 
trigger and not the cause of depressions. Important implications on crisis theory, 
economic policy, finance and financial regulation arise from this reasoning. 
Financialization, in this context, develops from the inherent contradictions of profit 
motivated growth as elaborated in Marx (Stravelakis 2012). Furthermore, the idea that 
in normal accumulation financial crises are shallow and rare has important 
implications for finance theory, asset pricing and financial regulation. In this regard 
we will theorize on empirical evidence initially elaborated by Robert Shiller (Shiller 
1980) who showed that volatility in dividends cannot explain volatility in stock 
prices. If however equity prices directly reflect corporate sector fundamentals as 
elaborated here a more realistic view of equity markets appears. This reasoning 
encompasses also derivatives and asset backed securities valuation as elaborated 
bellow. Finally in a world of true uncertainty as opposed to calculable risk financial 
regulation assumes different meaning and limitations. The focus moves from 
monitoring liquidity and solvency ratios to regulating what kind of assets financial 
intermediaries can sell and what kind of assets banks, pension funds, corporations and 
the broad public can hold. 
The paper structure is as follows: The first section (I) presents a simple 
framework which imitates the growth pattern in the period following the great 
stagflation of 70 s' and its' contradictions. The second section (II) explores financial 
crisis episodes with regard to equities, derivatives and asset backed securities. The 
third (III) section comments on the analytical findings focusing on financial 
regulation and the last section summarizes. 
I. The Aftermath of the Great Stagflation, Financialization and Growth:  
Persistently declining profit rates characterized post war capitalism. This led to 
a depression in the 1970 s' referred in literature as the "great stagflation". Severe labor 
market deregulation and wage suppression was the response to the crisis. State 
policies demolished the post war welfare state and in turn reduced the wage share. 
However, no vast destruction of capital took place and so profit rates stabilized 
but never increased to growth sustainable levels. In order to restore growth interest 
rates declined to historical lows, supported by low central bank intervention rates and 
severe deregulation of the financial sector. The aim was to boost the rate of profit of 
enterprise
1
 and enhance corporate investment. Mild growth returned, but increased 
leverage ratios triggered an unprecedented growth of the financial sector. Banks 
                                                          
1
 The rate of profit of enterprise is equal to the rate of profit minus the rate of interest. 
extended their balance sheets to exceptional levels based on moderate corporate 
deposits, while undertaking new forms of debt and supporting new assets, markets 
and non-bank financial intermediaries. Finance fused in all aspects of life and 
economists named the phenomenon: financialization of capital.  
The model which follows imitates the growth pattern in the years following the 
great stagflation. However, contrary to a good part of financialization literature, in our 
context, the increased weight of finance is triggered by low profitability and is also 
limited from it. In other words when financial expansion exceeds a certain limit 
imposed by the rate of profit the system collapses. This understanding of 
financialization removes the focus from the variety of assets and debt recipients and 
places it in the underlying conditions of production and growth. 
Some introductory remarks are appropriate at this point. Our model rests on the 
contention that profitability is the driver of growth. This implies of course that 
investment depends on profitability
2
. Because capitalism is an inherently dynamic 
system, where balance is reached through the succession of boom and crisis periods, 
the model is formulated in ratios and rates of growth rather than variable levels 
(Goodwin 1967
3
). In this regard the basic assumption is that the rate of growth of 
capital advanced (investment over total capital advanced) depends on the net 
                                                          
2
 Although this reasoning may seem obvious it is not, at least for economists. A good part of heterodox 
literature argues that corporate investment slowdown, following the depression of the 1970 s’, is 
independent of profitability. In this regard they explain financialization and the current crisis by 
applying monopoly theory in relation either to under-consumption arguments, or to the incentives of a 
rentier strata emerging from monopoly dominance. Below I make express reference to this literature a 
complete survey, however, is included in Tome 2011.          
3
 The sited paper is a path-breaking dynamic formulation of an economic model in terms of ratios and 
growth rates. Equilibrium is reached through the equalization of growth rates rather than variable 
levels.  
(corporate) rate of profit, the rate of savings and the rate of effective demand. The 
latter relies on the share of corporate profit out of total gross profit and the “leverage 
ratio” as shown below (Eq. I.4’). Furthermore, we make two additional introductory 
assumptions: 1) production takes time capital is advanced at the beginning of the 
production period whereas profits are realized at the end of the period and 2) 
corporate retained earnings are equal to total social savings. The second assumption 
(2) suggests that total wage, dividend and interest incomes are fully consumed. 
Notation and definitions appear in brief following model equations in the main text 
and are fully laid out in appendix 1 for easy reference.          
Since profitability is the driver of investment a modified Cambridge equation
4
 
(Pasinetti 1963, Marx 1893) is suitable to picture growth. The equation reads as 
follows:  
 
Equation (I.1) tells us that the rate of growth of capital advanced (K) depends on 
the rate of savings (s), the gross rate of profit (r) and the ratio of the share of corporate 
profits (NP) to total gross profits (Pr) divided by its' maximum value. The latter 
measures denoted by: (y=NP/Pr) for the share of corporate profit and (y max) for the 
maximum value. The first two elements (s, r) on the right hand side constitute the 
typical Cambridge equation. Peculiarity of (I.1) comes from the ratio (y/y max), 
which implies that growth depends on the net (corporate) rate of profit:    
t
t
t
t yr
K
NP
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 rather than the gross measure: 
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4
 The Cambridge equation is attributed to Pasinetti 1963, however here it is used in the sense presented 
in Capital VII i.e. the reinvestment of surplus value in expanded reproduction. 
assumption equalizing investment with savings is made, instead a positive leverage 
ratio equal to ( max/1 y =a/r, a>r) appears. Proof of this last point follows.  
Assuming constant profit (r) and interest (i) rates implies that the leverage ratio 
(capital over equity) is constant as well. For y max=r/a<1, s=i/r
5
 constant and 
assuming further that variations in equity (EQ) are equal to retained earnings:  
ttt NPsEQEQ  1 , equation (I.1) reads as follows:   
 
Consequently it holds: 
 
Equation (I.2) indicates also that parameter (a=Pr/EQ) is the gross return on 
equity. If (a=r) this implies that capital advanced equals equity or in other words that 
total debt is zero, which at this level of aggregation means that total investment 
always equals total savings (see initial assumption 2 above and equation I.4 below). 
For a>r, which is equivalent to a positive rate of interest (see equation I.8 below), 
excess demand appears in the event of corporate profits and excess supply for 
corporate losses
6. This last result is made evident in equation (I.4’) below.   
                                                          
5
 The definition of the rate of savings suggests that corporations adjust retained earnings to the rate of 
interest. High interest rates imply a high retention ratio and the opposite.   
6
 I have shown elsewhere (Stravelakis 2012) that for a sufficiently high rate of profit and variable 
interest rates, the latter determined by borrower lender competition, secular or chaotic growth prevails. 
In this context periods of excess demand are followed by excess supply the two motions dynamically 
cancelling each other. The model elaborated here implies deficit financed growth because of the 
constant, suppressed interest rate assumption, which in turn implies low profit rates.     
Motivation behind this growth pattern becomes clear from further modification 
in equation (I.1) in light of (I.2). Since the product ( ) is the net corporate rate of 
profit (I.1) takes the following form: 
 
Where, ROE is net return on equity (
1


t
t
t
EQ
NPs
ROE  ). In a world of roughly 
constant gross profit rates, like the times following the great stagflation, corporations, 
unable to influence the rate of profit, turned to a strategy aimed to increase returns on 
their own capital. Banks on the other hand came before two options: to raise lending 
rates near profit rates keeping borrowing roughly constant, or to suppress interest 
rates and extend their asset side. I have argued elsewhere (Stravelakis 2012) that if 
interest rates are left to borrower-lender competition in a low profit rate environment 
then they will rise to rate of profit levels turning the rate of profit of enterprise to zero. 
Banks picked the most profitable option, offering lower interest rates and lending 
grew from 1980 onwards.  
One final assumption suggesting that change in total debt is equal to total 
investment minus total savings closes the model. In our notation this reads as follows: 
 
Where (L) denotes aggregate borrowing
7
. If debt increases (ΔL>0) this implies 
excess demand, if it declines (ΔL<0) excess supply. Dividing both sides of (I.4) with 
 ( ) we can rewrite the relation in terms of ratios: 
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 The time subscript (t+1) in (I.4) means that mobilization in excess of savings is reflected in next 
years’ debt. In other words corporations spend their own capital before drawing down new debt 
facilities.  
Equation (I.4’), mentioned in passing in various occasions above, indicates the 
deficit financed growth pattern underlying our model which approximates the actual 
growth pattern experienced during the last thirty years. Because (a) is assumed greater 
than (r), the corporate profit rate triggers excess demand, which accelerates 
investment but also debt growth. The opposite holds in the event of corporate losses. 
In order to assess the sustainability of this growth pattern we move to model solution.     
Equations I.1-I.4 together with the definition 
( )) (see appendix 1) solve the model as 
elaborated in appendix 2. The following non-linear difference map determines the 
time path of the share of corporate profit and thereby the rate of growth:  
 
Equation (I.5) is a discrete time "logistic map" (May 1975) well-known and 
broadly used in biology to picture population dynamics. The following convenient 
forms (also derived in appendix 2) are helpful in analyzing the complex dynamics of 
(I.5):  
 
 
 
Equation (I.6) is the typical "logistic map" format where dynamics depend on 
the value of parameter (φ). But the most intuitive form is equation (I.7) where the 
term 2i  denotes the system "carrying capacity", in other words the maximum value 
ROE can take. For parameter values (φ<4) maximum ROE remains below carrying 
capacity and the system exhibits secular or chaotic growth. But for φ>4 ROE at some 
point pierces the maximum value following which the system collapses. These two 
states appear in the simulation charts which follow:  
 
 
In Chart 1 the value of φ is 3.9 and although the rate of growth follows a chaotic 
pattern involving milder or more severe fluctuations the value of ROE never exceeds 
"carrying capacity". In the second chart φ=4.06, although a chaotic pattern appears 
again after several fluctuations the value of ROE slightly exceeds "carrying capacity" 
(point marked on chart), following this the rate of growth collapses, return on equity 
receives negative values, indicating corporate losses, which keep coming period after 
period until meltdown.  
What are the underlying economics explaining stable or semi-stable fluctuations 
and alternatively collapse? To understand the mechanics we will use a second 
property of the logistic equation that of competition. The main idea underlying the 
biological application of the equation is that limited resources constrain population 
Chart 2 Φ=4.06 
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growth. In other words a population competes for survival until it exhausts 
subsistence means following which it declines. In our context this means a limit value 
beyond which ROE begins to drop. We can determine this value rewriting (I.7) as 
follows:  
 
The greater the value of the parameter ( 2)1( i  ) the greater the value ROE 
can take before declining. Therefore it is reasonable for corporations and banks to 
seek a rate of interest that will maximize ( 2)1( i  ). The form has a maximum 
(derived in appendix 3) for:  
 
Equation (I.8) suggests that positive interest rates appear only for a>r justifying 
the assumption made so far. However, our reasoning supports further elaboration on 
parameter values. Since the strategy presented is meaningful for a positive rate of 
profit of enterprise, then there exists a minimum leverage ratio required for growth. 
The following expression specifies the minimum:  
 
From (I.9) it is clear that the strategy applies for leverage ratios greater than two 
(2), otherwise corporations will have no reason to undertake production risks.  
Furthermore, the growth rate associated with a particular rate of profit of 
enterprise is sustainable for ( 4 ). Substituting (I.8) into Eq. (I.7) (definition of φ) 
above the following sustainability condition appears: 
 
Equation I.10 tells us that sustainable growth prevails for profit rates greater 
than a certain minimum (in our case 1/3). Keeping in mind that the need to suppress 
interest rates comes from low profit rates in the first place, it follows that the growth 
path prevailing under this strategy is either unsustainable in the first place, or turns 
unsustainable following a slight decline in the rate of profit or the rate of interest. 
Moreover, dynamics pictured in Chart 2, where sudden collapse follows a long period 
of secular growth, demonstrate that instability can remain hidden for long making 
things look stable on the surface.  
This superficial stability was the basis of mainstream contentions that 
unimpeded growth would persist for the foreseeable future. It was only a minority of 
heterodox economists who raised concerns on the sustainability of deficit financed 
growth (Godley 1999, Papadimitriou et.al 2004). However, mainstream approaches 
insisted that economic expansion was “structural” and unrelated to rising demand 
(Phelps 2000). As usual policy makers concurred with the mainstream (Greenspan 
2000) and the deficit financed accumulation pattern continued unchecked until the 
outburst of the crisis in 2007.  
But there is more to read out of this simple framework. From equations (I.4), 
(I.7) and the identity (y=NP/Pr) the following equation of debt growth appears 
(derivation in appendix 4):  
 
Although credit expands, during the period which precedes collapse, capital and 
profits grow faster than debt in most cases
8
. This means that banks experience 
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 Since profits grow at a rate equal to the return on equity (ROE), it is not difficult to ascertain that 
if
2a
ra
ROE

  then profits will grow faster than debt. The reader can verify that the inequality holds 
for plausible parameter values. 
increased liquidity which is not absorbed from corporate debt growth. It was this 
liquidity which made banks turn to consumer credit, speculative short term 
investments, new classes of assets and financial intermediaries. Good part of 
heterodox literature has focused on this side of financialization disregarding at the 
same time that it results from a pattern designed to restore growth in a low profit rate 
environment. Explanations on the rising weight of finance range from increased 
monopolization (Magdoff & Sweezy 1997, Lapavitsas 2011) to the prevalence of 
“rentiers” motivated by “perverse incentives” (Crotty 2009, Epstein 2005). We will 
critically assess these views in various occasions in the next section.  
Returning to our main argument, it is clear from (I.11) that financial assets 
assume a substantial portion of corporate and bank asset side as deficit financed 
growth proceeds. The latter “sets the scenery” of financial crisis. To explain how it 
bursts we need to turn to finance theory and asset pricing. 
II. Asset Pricing from the Fundamentals, Implications for Financial Crisis:     
Alongside with the debt market, incorporated in our framework, we assume, 
there exists an equity market where trades on corporate and banking shares take place. 
Following the unanimously accepted principle that capital mobility tends to equalize 
risk free returns between sectors (Dybvig & Ross 1992 ), returns in our equity market 
remain in line with an underlying "required rate of return" (hereafter rror). However, 
contrary to mainstream wisdom (Campbell 1991)
9
, but very much in line with 
empirical findings (Shiller 1980), this required rate of return is not assumed constant 
and equal to the lifetime rate of return of a particular investment. The reason is that 
fluctuations in demand produce secular growth patterns, as pictured in Charts 1, 2 
above, which in turn alter the rate of return of the corporate sector creating arbitrage 
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Actually in the sited paper Campbell acknowledges the limitations of constant required rates of return 
also suggested by the efficient market hypothesis.  
positions in the equity market. Equity holdings are therefore inherently short-term 
reflecting short-term corporate sector returns. This in turn implies that equity market 
risk is roughly equal to that of the corporate sector (Shaikh 1997). A measure closely 
associated with the required rate of return is the short-term rate of profit:   
 
Where (u) is capacity utilization.  The measure (  ) pictured in (II.1) is a 
measure of short-term profitability of corporate investment, as opposed to lifetime 
rate of return which is equal, in our context, to the rate of profit (r). The latter prevails 
in full capacity utilization. When capacity is underutilized  (capacity utilization is 
bellow unity) gross return on total capital outstanding falls below the basic gross rate 
of profit, the opposite holds when capacity is over- utilized. Furthermore, variable 
(irf), appearing in (II.1), measures the risk free interest rate in the current conditions 
of production and growth. The risk free interest rate is equal to the constant interest 
rate (i) minus yearly standard deviation of the rate of growth.  It enters as negative 
factor in (II.1) since it represents returns foregone when equity investments are 
undertaken.  
Assuming that capacity utilization (u) equals to the ratio of capital advanced to 
year-end corporate total capital (equity capital plus borrowed capital) we can denote 
the measure as follows: 
 
When capital advanced is less than year-end total capital this indicates under-
utilization of existing capacity. In the event that capital advanced exceeds total 
capital, for example when customers advance funds against yet undelivered 
commodities, capacity is over utilized. From equation (I.2), the identity (y=NP/Pr) 
and dividing the numerator and denominator with capital advanced (K), (II.2) takes 
the following form: 
 
Increased capacity utilization implies an increased share of corporate profits in 
the next period. In times of relatively low debt (compared to gross profit) corporations 
employ their excess capacity which leads to an increased share of corporate profits. 
As capacity utilization approaches or exceeds unity, corporations accumulate debt to 
extend productive capacity and the share of corporate profit declines because of 
increased interest payments. Corporations downsize production, reducing capacity 
utilization, to release liquidity and profit growth declines until the corporate debt/ 
gross profit ratio is sufficiently reduced. In normal accumulation the process roughly 
repeats itself, however when the economy reaches breakdown things change 
dramatically. Although production contracts, corporations remain illiquid, since any 
reduction in outstanding debt goes together with extended corporate losses. 
At the bottom of the cycle banks and financial capital in general observe 
increasing capacity utilization and turn part of their liquidity to equity investments, in 
order to enjoy capital gains coming from increased corporate profitability. As result 
the price of both corporate and banking shares increases, discounting the expected 
increase in profitability. When loan demand accelerates banks liquidate most of their 
equity holdings realizing their gains and boosting their liquidity in light of increasing 
loan demand. Things again change when breakdown times arrive. Although banks 
dispose most of their equity holdings when debt accelerates and before the time 
growth exceeds systemic "carrying capacity", liquidity is not restored, because the 
depository base deteriorates from corporate losses. Banks dispose any remaining 
equity holdings at a loss to increase their liquidity and corporations having exhausted 
their reserves soon turn to them seeking means to finance their losses.  
A good part of past and contemporary economic literature interprets equity 
market breakdown as the cause of a depression because it precedes it. By extending 
our framework to encompass equity market arbitrage, stock market collapse again 
precedes the outburst of depressions without causing it. 
Following Shiller (Shiller 1989) (in part) we assume that equity prices are given 
by the following formula:  
 
Where (P) is the aggregate all shares equity index. Equation (II.3) indicates that 
the rate of growth of stock prices equals to the net required rate of return. When 
capacity utilization is high the "gross required rate of return" ( ) exceeds the 
"default free" interest rate and stock prices rise, the opposite holds in low capacity 
utilization. But increased capacity utilization reflects next year corporate profitability, 
as shown in equation (II.2'). It is for this reason that stock price reductions/ increases 
precede reductions/ increases in output and profitability. The simulation chart which 
follows pictures this result.  
 
Chart 3 presents an unstable return on equity (ROE) path and the stock returns 
associated with it (blue line). Although sharp corrections and longer losing strings can 
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appear, as market on the chart (red arrow), stock returns remain overall positive as 
long as ROE remains positive and consequently corporate profits keep growing. But 
when ROE turns negative indicating a breakdown (black arrow) a sharp stock market 
correction precedes corporate profitability decline. It is the lead of stock market crash 
over actual depression episodes which creates the impression that the stock market 
crash is the cause, although causality runs the other way around. 
We can take this reasoning further, assuming also that a derivative market is in 
operation. Mainstream economists suggest that trading of derivative contracts 
improves “efficiency” for the underlying asset market, by broadening the portfolio 
selection perspectives and reducing transaction costs (Pyle 1993). On this intellectual 
justification a 457 trillion dollar “notional amount outstanding” market stood in mid-
2008 (Mai 2008). Of this notional amount only 16% trades in organized exchanges 
whereas the remainder involves “over the counter” (OTC) transactions. But the most 
astonishing fact is that despite financial crisis the OTC derivatives market grew 
further exceeding the world GDP and reaching the unbelievable amount of 693 trillion 
dollars in mid-2013 (Bank of International Settlements Statistical Bulletin Nov. 
2013). Finally, recent studies (Avellaneda & Cont 2011) indicate that almost 90% of 
equity OTC derivative contracts take place between dealers and only 10% between 
dealers and “end users”. The latter indicates that most of derivative transactions are of 
speculative nature.      
Given the risks undertaken and the nature of transactions, one would expect that 
strong arguments supporting market efficiency underlie mainstream postulations. 
Regretfully, the whole argument rests on modern investment theory assumptions 
concerning underlying asset returns. Indicative in this regard is standard pricing of 
equity index forwards, used hereafter as an example derivative, where the risk free 
interest rate is the constant required rate of return. In other words “strike price” 
determination comes from the application of a constant risk free rate (see equation 
(II.6) below). This same argument is extended further, by assuming normally 
distributed equity returns, to price “option contracts” under the celebrated Black-
Scholes framework.       
We can price an outright equity forward from our simple framework. Given the 
simulated data in hand, we can find a time path for index prices from (II.3), and the 
yearly standard deviation of growth from figures generated by (I.7). This data together 
with the constant rate of interest are sufficient to price the equity forward under the 
following standard formulas:  
 
 
 
Where (cifr) is (ifr) in compound form and (F) stands for the yearly forward. 
Equation (II.4) determines the default free interest rate at the beginning of the period, 
(II.5) is the compound form of (II.4) and (II.6) the formula of the one year forward. 
Given our framework of stock returns, but also actual data, it is evident that 
derivatives are systematically miss-priced since their pricing rely on a theory which 
has no relevance with actual data. Many economists, professionals and 
mathematicians have acknowledged the fact (Mandelbrot & Hutson 2006).  
The systematic pattern of derivative pricing against the underlying asset gave 
rise to a wide range of speculative financial intermediaries seeking higher returns by 
exploiting derivatives and these intermediaries are no other than the hedge funds. 
Banks supported hedge fund growth by granting them credit and derivative lines. 
Derivative lines support equity purchases without cash advances, limiting at the same 
time maximum contract value (notional amount outstanding). Each contract occupies 
a part of the line determined by the product of underlying asset volatility and contract 
notional value. This practice, however, relies on the assumption that underlying asset 
returns follow the normal distribution. In other words that volatility remains roughly 
stable. If volatility varies and it does, the line may suddenly become insufficient and 
the borrower will either have to come up with cash or liquidate his positions. For 
positions "in the money" this is not a problem, actually the bank will extend the line 
to cover the customer, problems begin when derivatives are "out of the money". But 
again in a relatively stable growth environment banks will finance derivative losses 
(by turning the derivative line to a credit line or by rolling over the derivative 
position) it is again in times of breakdown that things turn dramatic.  
By elaborating on the strategy of Macro Hedge Funds we will see how financial 
crisis becomes possible. Macro Hedge Funds speculate on big fluctuations in asset 
prices (in our context equity and derivative prices) assuming that it reflects a 
discrepancy between the market and the underlying fundamentals. By exploiting the 
discrepancy the hedge fund anticipates extraordinary profits. But this can imply that 
the normality assumption holds for equity returns as some hedge fund managers 
suggest (Nicholas 2008). More specifically, returns falling more than one standard 
deviation away from the mean reflect  potential miss-pricing, since from the 
properties of the normal distribution 85% of asset returns should fall within one 
standard deviation from the mean. Furthermore, if asset returns are "normally 
distributed" this implies also that the underlying fundamentals are roughly stable as 
well. Therefore, any diversion will generate an opposite motion, since it comes from 
random occurrences.  
The chart which follows (chart 4) compares the distribution optimally fitting 
equity returns generated from (II.1) (blue line), with a normal distribution calculated 
from the mean and standard deviation of the same data (purple line).  
 The distribution best fitting the data is a four parameter Dagum distribution 
(Dagum 1975). Returns on the horizontal axis are differences from the mean and 
probabilities appear on the vertical axis. The two shaded regions picture the areas of 
interest for macro hedge funds. For return values in the left hand side shaded area the 
hedge fund builds long forward positions. In the same fashion short forward positions 
are appropriate for returns in the shaded area on the right hand side
10
. However, the 
hedge fund miscalculates risk in both occasions. The most important miscalculation 
appears in the left hand side tail of the two distributions marked by the black arrow on 
Chart 4. Actual return distribution (blue line) has a long tail where finite probabilities 
appear for very low returns whereas in the assumed normal distribution (purple line) 
this probability is practically zero. Hedge funds assuming normally distributed returns 
took long derivative positions at this level of returns anticipating strong recovery. 
Instead they witnessed market collapse. Banks experiencing, during the same period, 
deterioration of their depository base were reluctant to finance these losses. This was 
the reason many macro hedge funds failed in the period of the financial crisis.  
                                                          
10
 This is by no means an exhaustion of potential hedge fund strategies but only a simplistic example. 
However, we can safely claim that almost every macro hedge fund strategy is vulnerable to extreme 
negative returns.    
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Economists and market professionals have used this finding to make a case for 
the causes of the current depression. The financial analyst Nicholas Taleb (Taleb 
2009) argued that underestimation in the likelihood of extreme surprise events, "black 
swans" in his terminology, is responsible for the meltdown. Heterodox economists 
argue that "financialization" is the child of neo-liberal ideology (Fine 2011) which 
reached a climax in the theory of self – regulated markets, i.e. markets which could 
calculate risks correctly, thereby self-constraining any excesses. Under this reasoning, 
deregulated financial institutions undertook extensive derivative positions generating 
losses in excess of the underlying asset price reduction. This resulted to the depression 
caused from financial crisis spillover. What the argument misses is that excessive 
impairment of "fictitious capital", for example capital recorder in the “notional 
amount” of derivative contracts, reflects breakdown in the valorization of real capital 
as argued here. 
Finally we will consider asset backed securities valuation, since the collapse of 
the mortgage-backed securities market triggered the current depression. Although 
these assets entered our everyday vocabulary following the subprime market collapse, 
they are by no means new. U.S. government owned or government-sponsored 
enterprises with a history going back to the years of the great depression have been 
issuing this type of securities for decades. For government agencies (Ginnie Mae) and 
government – sponsored agencies (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) securities rated 
triple A (AAA) were issued, since markets consider(ed) these assets backed by the 
U.S. government. This is the “prime” mortgage backed securities market. But as bank 
liquidity grew in the fashion pictured by our equation (I.11) and banks turned good 
part of this liquidity to consumer lending, lower quality mortgages were turned to 
“collateralized debt obligations” (CDOs). The latter is the “subprime” mortgage 
backed securities market which triggered the depression. As interest rates were 
suppressed to historical lows from 1980 onwards mortgage backed securities 
gradually assumed the greatest part of bond markets.  The reason is simple they 
offered a premium over corporate and sovereign bonds of the same rating, the 
premium representing compensation against the uncertainty of mortgage refinance. 
Consequently as interest rates declined and the likelihood of mortgage refinance was 
reduced these securities became more and more attractive. However, the market 
underplayed the risk that banks would be unable or reluctant to refinance bad 
mortgages, in other words the market underplayed the likelihood of a depression as 
elaborated below.                       
Although we can only consider securities "backed" by corporate loans in our 
context, the valuation method is valid for other types of asset backed securities. For 
reasons of simplicity we will assume that half of the bank loan portfolio comprises of 
productive corporations paying interest at a rate below the average (i), while the other 
half pays interest at a rate above average. We will assume further that banks pool their 
loans in two units (tranches) one involving productive low-interest corporate loans 
and the other unproductive high interest loans. They then issue one year securities on 
each unit which they sell through "special purpose vehicles". Returns, risks and 
excess returns for both units appear in the equations which follow:  
 
 
Where (rtr) stands for return on tranches 1 and 2 and (rope) denotes the rate of 
profit of enterprise for the two corporate groups. Expected excess returns, denoted as 
(ertr), are equal to half the annual volatility of growth for group 1 and one and a half 
(1.5) times volatility of growth for group 2. Although the first unit will have a positive 
rate of profit of enterprise if r>i (II.7), the second unit may experience negative (rope) 
even if the corporations included have an average rate of profit equal to the economy 
average (II.8). Therefore in highly volatile growth security holders rely on the 
willingness of banks to refinance these loans, which in turn rests on the conviction 
that growth will resume enabling the borrower to perform. This is of course the case 
when banks are liquid. But when bank liquidity deteriorates like the times close to 
breakdown things change. The simulation chart which follows pictures the risk 
associated with unit 2 securities in various states of the economy.  
 
The blue line is the rate of profit of enterprise of unit 2 calculated as in (II.8). 
The purple line is the return on equity (gross profit growth) for the whole economy as 
before and the black line the rate of growth of profit less the rate of growth of debt. 
The latter is a measure of bank liquidity growth. Although the rate of profit of 
enterprise turns negative in many occasions, profits catch up quickly and banks 
refinance low-grade debt. At the eve of breakdown however (marked by the arrow on 
chart 5) as the rate of profit of enterprise of unit 2 turns negative banks experience a 
huge decline in liquidity, because the corporate sector as a whole experiences losses. 
As result low-grade loans do not get refinanced and asset backed security holders 
experience huge losses.  
The scenario presented roughly imitates the collapse of the sub-prime market in 
the U.S. Securities issued on low-grade mortgages, the so-called "toxic" unit, were 
held on the assumption that the housing market will keep growing and collateral will 
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cover the loan. This in turn implied that banks would refinance mortgages when 
turned problematic protecting the security holders from capital losses. When this did 
not happen in 2007 the market collapsed.  
A good deal of contemporary heterodox literature understood the sub-prime 
collapse as the cause of the crisis, in a "post hoc ergo propter hoc" (Tobin 1970) 
reasoning elucidated above and the level of wages as the cause of the sub-prime 
collapse. The wage incomes expropriation theory (Lapavitsas 2009) and the 
monopoly version of the under-consumption argument fall in this category. In the 
latter capitalism is stagnant by nature and growth resulted from consumer credit 
expansion (Magdoff & Sweezy 1987). Both versions arrive to an amazing conclusion: 
world capitalism entered a depression because wages were low limiting commercial 
credit expansion!  
We have used a simple framework to show that an unstable growth path 
emerging from low profitability produces financial crisis episodes because corporate 
growth cannot absorb bank liquidity. In this context, financial crisis reflected in spiky 
reductions of returns on various asset categories (stocks, derivatives, asset backed 
securities) precede sharp reductions in output and employment. This result rests on 
the assumption that returns on financial assets reflect (short-term) underlying 
fundamentals. The latter follow patterns quite different from those anticipated by 
neoclassical theory and elaborated by "modern investment theory". This reasoning has 
important implications for economic policy and financial regulation demonstrated in 
the following section. 
III. The World Economy in the Post Bear Sterns Era:  
The failure of the investment bank Bear Sterns in 2007 marked the beginning of 
the current depression. At first regulators thought it was an isolated case which could 
be contained through traditional monetary policy tools. By mid-2008, however, the 
subprime market failure made clear that the situation required extraordinary measures, 
since most of the U.S. banking system had collapsed. The main policy followed aimed 
to securitize banks through capital injection, troubled asset purchases and central bank 
accommodation against low-grade collateral. Governments supported this policy with 
state budgets. The state issued bonds to raise central bank capital and support the 
"socialization" of financial sector losses. In the U.S. alone public debt increased from 
about 8.7 trillion dollars in 2007 to 16.4 trillion dollars in the end of 2012.  
These monies prevented meltdown mainly by enabling banks to revolve or turn 
corporate debt to equity, maintaining consumer credit as well. Most of economic 
activity remained in place instead of collapsing and world economy entered a period 
of stagnation and high unemployment. In our context this means that parameter (a) 
reduced to sustainable levels. But this involves also an increase in the effective 
interest rate (Eq.I.8) and a stagnant rate of profit of enterprise (Eq.I.9). The latter 
explains stagnation, high unemployment and impoverishment of big parts of the world 
population.  
For contemporary mainstream literature crisis persistence is unanimously 
accepted nowadays. Explanations vary, ranging from high debt (mainly public debt) 
hampering growth (Reinhart & Rogoff 2013)
11
, to blaming austerity policies applied 
to contain debt (actually to suppress wages). The latter approach stresses the 
limitations of monetary policy summarized in the so-called "zero interest limit" and 
promotes fiscal expansion (Krugman 2012). However, the first explanation disregards 
that low returns brought about the debt crisis in the first place, while the second 
ignores that in a depression corporations and banks sequester monies rather than 
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 I site the last paper of the two authors because in it they admit on one hand that the crisis persist over 
the last six years and second that austerity measures cannot turn debt sustainable as argued so far by 
austerity policy proponents. 
invest them. Therefore, Keynesian "trickle down" policies justifying fiscal expansion 
have limited effect.  
The reasoning detailed in this paper suggests alternative policies promoting 
direct state investments (Shaikh 2011). That is policies restoring economic activity 
and bank liquidity through increases in employment. As we have shown profit 
motivated growth breaks down in a depression, it is state investments following social 
goals that can offer employment to those who need it the most and have a “rise up” 
effect on businesses serving the increased demand.   
Nevertheless, official policies support different trends. As public debts pile up 
and bank liquidity surges speculative financial investments are taking up substantial 
part of bank portfolios. Meantime stock exchanges have hit record prices, not 
supported by corporate fundamentals.  All these are raising concerns that a new 
financial crisis is around the corner. As response central banks are downsizing 
accommodation policies and governments are issuing new bank regulation directives 
at the same time. The most clear policy outline is the "Volcker rule" passed on Dec 
10th 2013 by the U.S. legislative bodies. A similar but slower process is taking place 
in the E.U. around the so-called "banking union".  
Sticking to the "Volcker rule" because of concreteness we note that its' main 
aim is to prevent banks from assuming equity and derivative risk through hedge funds 
and other vehicles, but does not prevent them from running that risk directly in their 
balance sheet. The only factor discouraging assimilation of risk is increasing capital 
requirements. This is a policy relying on the assumption that financial assets carry a 
particular amount of relatively stable risk. If risk is stable banks can securitize 
depositors by assigning the appropriate amount of additional capital to back risky 
assets appropriations. But, as we have shown above, this does not hold especially 
when growth trends turn unstable, in such times capital requirements will prove 
insufficient and the taxpayer will again lift the burden. The "Volcker rule" is the latest 
chapter in a long series of regulations going back to the "Peel act"
12
 in mid-19th 
century England. Marx in Capital VIII (Marx 1959) mocked this early policy for 
being useless when the system was in normal accumulation and was withdrawn in the 
crisis of the 1850 s' to avoid bank failures.  
The target of bank regulation is to protect the broad public, at least in part. 
Given uncertainty underlying financial markets, the rules applied must focus on what 
kind of assets pension funds, banks and the broad public can hold and to what 
proportions, in order to contain future damages. Depressions cannot be managed away 
through appropriate policies, because they emerge from the contradictions of profit 
motivated growth. This is why depressions appear every thirty to forty years the first 
on record dated as back as 1790. In this regard financial crises will always be a 
potential trigger of such events and regulation policies can only mediate losses by 
directly constraining risk. This means that institutions which take deposits or pension 
plan installments cannot hold just any kind of risky asset and the assets permitted 
cannot assume just any proportion of the asset side.      
Returning to the present, the likelihood of a new major financial crisis depends 
on how stable is the roughly stagnant growth path prevailing. Stability seems to rely 
on the extraordinary liquidity measures primarily of the Fed, the Bank of Japan and 
secondarily of the ECB. These policies are keeping interest rates low. Capital 
impairment that would boost the rate of profit leading to gradual recovery seems to 
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 The Peel act of 1844 named after the British premier Sir Robert Peel on one hand prevented 
commercial banks from issuing their own banknotes and on the other placed restrictions on the bank of 
England in issuing banknotes. The idea was that with the restrictions in place inflation would remain 
stable and financial panics would seize to appear. Marx scorns the fact that the restrictions of the act 
were never needed /applied in normal accumulation and the act was abandoned altogether when the 
system entered a depression. 
move in a slow and contradictory pace. Therefore when these policies are withdrawn 
financial panics and sharp corrections cannot be ruled out.  
Overall the resolution of the present depression is proceeding at a very slow 
pace so far. Looking back to the history of crises it resembles the 1870-1890 
depression, the longest on record. Therefore policy makers should be very cautious in 
declaring the end of the crisis and should focus on its’ devastating consequences 
instead.    
Summary:  
We presented a simple framework analytically supporting the notion that profit 
driven growth turns unstable when the rate of profit is below a certain limit. 
Furthermore, if low profit rates are associated with suppressed interest rates finance 
assumes increasing weight like the period following the great stagflation of the 70 s'. 
The latter implies that major financial crisis episodes become likely triggering sharp 
reductions in output and employment.  Model dynamics picture a path of secular 
growth followed by a sudden collapse imitating the growth pattern following the 
“great stagflation” and the subprime meltdown which triggered the current 
depression. 
Besides implications on financial asset valuation this rationale indicates that 
financial regulation cannot rule out future crises, because crises emerge from the 
underlying contradictions of profit motivated growth. Regulatory policies can only 
temper future financial losses if implemented on the type and amounts of financial 
assets held by Banks, Pension funds and the broad public.  
This approach differs from the reasoning underlying recent regulatory 
legislation like the “Volker rule”. The latter relies on the contention that stable 
calculable risk is associated with every asset and in this regard appropriate capital 
requirements constrain risks undertaken by financial institutions. Regulation is 
thereby limited to monitoring sound liquidity and solvency ratios by forcing banks to 
assume risk directly on their balance sheet. The latter indicates further, that regulators 
blame the “shadow” banking system (hedge funds, special vehicles etc.) for the 
current depression. We showed that if asset returns depend on corporate sector 
fundamentals financial asset risk is highly unstable and any solvency ratio will prove 
insufficient when the economy reaches breakdown point. Similar empirical results on 
financial asset risk are common knowledge in the economic profession following the 
path breaking work of Shiller (Shiller 1980).          
The framework presented indicates further that depression will be over when 
sufficient capital is impaired on a world scale to support an increase in the rate of 
profit. In this regard crisis resolution lies ahead of us. Securitization of banking 
capital prevented economic meltdown, but, at the same time, initiated a contradictory 
process where capital is impaired at a very slow pace while stagnation prevails. If this 
stagnant growth path is dependent on central bank liquidity measures, in the sense that 
central bank policies keep effective interest rates low, then the relinquishment of these 
policies will mark the return of financial panics. In a panel, during the January 2014 
conference of the American Economic Association, chief IMF economist Olivier de 
Blanchard arrived to a similar conclusion. He suggested that multiple equilibrium 
positions stand before world economy depending on the rate of interest prevailing 
after the abandonment of central bank extraordinary liquidity policies.       
It is beyond doubt that recent mainstream literature (Reinhart & Rogoff 2013, 
Krugman 2012, De Long & Summers 2012) acknowledges that we are in the middle 
of a depression. However, economic reasoning underlying these arguments has 
important policy implications. Neoclassical economists reach the conclusion that high 
debt /GDP ratios are the cause of the crisis suggesting fiscal austerity as the 
resolution. Neo-Keynesians, on the other hand, consider austerity policies as the 
cause, preaching in favor of fiscal expansion.  Good part of heterodox literature has 
shown that wage suppression, standing behind austerity policies, is not sufficient for 
restoring the rate of profit. Moreover, Keynesian “trickle down” policies justifying 
fiscal expansion are not effective in depression times when profit rates are low.  
Alternative policies relying on state direct investment in order to boost 
employment are appropriate now that profit motivated growth has broken down. 
Elaborating on the characteristics and limitations of such policy will be the focus of 
future work.  
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